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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Study 1. 1, Operations Analysis, addressed two major
subjects related to future STS operations concepts. The majority of
effort was directed at assessing the benefits of automated space ser-
vicing concepts as related to improvements in payload procurement and
Shuttle utilization. The second subject was directed at understanding
Shuttle upper stage software development and recurring costs relative
to total program projections.
1. 1	 SPACE SERVICING CONCEPTS
Space servicing of automated payloads has the potential
to reduce future space program costs and provide a great deal of flexi-
bility relative to conducting mission operations. The subject is
addresser' in this effort by examining the broad spectrum of payload
applications with the belief that shared logistic operations will be a
major contributor to reduction of future program costs. However,
there are certain requirements for support of payload operations,
such as availability of the payload, that may place demands upon the
Shuttle fleet. Because future projections of the NASA Mission Model
are only representative of the payload traffic, it is important to recog-
nize that it is the general character of operations that is significant
rather than service to any single payload program.
Space servicing, as employed for this Study, implies
an ability to extend the life of a given payload by replacing modular
increments rather than a complete payload. In so doing, the total
weight to orbit can be reduced; also, the feasibility of sharing flight
operations moves closer to reality, both of which contribute to
I
	
	
reduced operating costs. However, failure patterns over such a
broad spectrum of payloads will inherently be random and this ran-
dom nature may place demands for servicing at a time when the Shuttle
is occupied with other commitments, such as sorties. So it is impor-
F
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tant to see if savings can be realized without undue penalty to eithe_
the payload community or the Shuttle community.
To assess space servicing, it was necessary to develop
an entirely new data base of payload definitions. Weight and relia-
bility characteristics are the principal features required. In addition,
it was necessary to develop a computer simulation program to repre-
sent the various elements of each payload and simulate the random
pattern of failure events. Although the total model is considered,
emphasis has been placed on servicing payloads in geostationary orbit.
The results indicate that a substantial cost benefit can be realized
sufficient to compensate for DDT&E costs associated with the payload
and service mechanism design efforts as well as the associated ser-
vicing operation.
1.2	 PAYLOAD/TUG SOFTWARE COST ESTIMATES
Software costs were addressed because very little firm
data exist. Speculation of software costs for the upper stage, especially
if servicing is employed, has provided a broad band of cost estimates.
Consequently, the effort here was devoted to developing an understand-
ing of the driving factors affecting software costs and then developing
sufficient data to allow a valid estimate of upper stages or T • 	 -its
that may be incurred in the future.
The results of this effort indicate that existing u.,.t Esti-
mating Relationships (CERs) are insufficient in the present form but
can provide a basis of understanding. Modifying factors were developed
based upon such historical data as Apollo, Titan IIIC, and Centaur pro-
grams and applied to airborne, ground support, and mission control
center software costs. It is estimated that software development costs
for the Shuttle upper stage including multiple rendezvous, docking, and
servicing functions should not exceed an initial cost of $21 rniliion, with
a recurring cost of $2. 5 million a.rnital!jr.
-2-
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2. SPACE SERVICING CONCEPTS
1. 1	 GENERAL
Study 2. 1, Operations Analysis, had as its principal
objective the investigation of new operational concepts fur the Shuttle
era. Attention was directed primarily at space servicing of automated
payload programs and the impact this could have on upper stage designs
and overall resources utilization. Although this is not an economics
study, cost benefits resulting; from space servicing carp be determined
in a gross sense so that the concept can be pursued further within NASA,
or included in detail design studies with other contractors.
To perform this study it was necessary to develop an
entirely new data base and analysis technique. C: ndidate payloads
were selected from the October 1973 NASA Mission Model of Automated
Payload Opportunities and reconfigured for space servicing. This design
process resulted in a set of standard space replaceable units (SRUs) which
serve as the builuing blocks of each serviceable payload. Mission equip-
ment for each candidate payload was also reconfigured for space servicing.
A complex computer simulation program was developed to
support the analysis of space servicing. This statistical program employs
Monte Carlo techniques to establish failure events which then require ser-
vicing by the Space Shuttle with an upper stage to put the payloads back into
an operating condition. Various upper stage configurations can be
employed in the analysis. The computer prograrn has been implemented
for NASA use at the NASA Computation Facility, Slidell, Louisiana.
Although space servicing of automated payloads appears to
be attractive for individual programs, in the past it has not been shown
that its application in a broad sense would be beneficial. Since servic-
ing operations are random in nature, they may place severe demands on
the logistic fleet which could otherwise be occupied by operations such
as Sorties. Consequently, the total emission model must be considered
-3-
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and the following questions assessed:
1. Can the total number of flights be reduced by space
servicing of payloads?
2. Can the total payload procurement be reduced?
3. Are the benefits sufficient to justify the DDT&E
costs and the risk associated with developing a new
concept?
2.2	 PAYLOAD RECONFIGURATION FOR SPACE SERVICING
This portion of study effort was divided into several sub-
tasks, all associated with developing data and performing subsequent
tradeoff analyses. The most important of these was the development
of a space serviceable payload data base. Information from several
detailed payload redesign efforts was employed together with the results
of this study to provide a composite of subsystem and mission equipment
weights, volumes, acid reliabilities. This new data base has been issued
as an Aerospace report (Ref. 1). A summary of the content is provided
below.
The subsystem requirements for 42 payload programs were
evaluated to establish the range over which any set of standard equipment
would have to perform. Four subsystem categories were selected: Atti-
tude and Velocity Control, Guidance and Navigation, Telemetry and Com-
niand, and Electrical Power. Certain high reliability components were
incorporated with the basic structure of each payload to form a non-
replaceable unit (NRU). This was the framework within which the space	 A
replaceable units (SRUs) could be inserted and removed as required for
servicing. Mission equipments were also placed upon SRU baseplates
to be re p laced either because of failures or for equipment improvement.
This information was then c u ed to reconfigure an example
satellite for space servicing. The selected design was the NASA Earth
Observatory Satellite (EOS). The baseline definition is shown along with
its reconfigured version in Figure I. The mission equipment modules are
principally located around the periphery of the ring frame to allow for
futL re growth of equipment. Subsystem modules, where the size can be
-4-
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controlled, are loca .ed inside the ng frame. This general configura-
tion was then employed for the remaining space serviceable payload
candidates. In all, 29 different designs were developed to satisfy the
42 payload programs. 'Thirty-four different subsystem SRUr were
required along with 104 mission equipment modules. In general, the
weight growth for payloads over 1000 kg (current design) was 10 to 30
percent.
A sample of this technique is illustrated in Table 1. The
telemetry tracking and command (TT&C) requirements for various
sets of payloads under consideration were summarized as shown in
this example. These requirements were Cher, transferred into a set
of subsystem block diagrams as shown in Figure 2, each diagram sat
-isfying a specific set of the payload requirements. This then defines
the design elements of one of the TT&C space replacea' , ,e units (SRU).
Each block diagram is further broken into specific com-
ponents, necessary to meet specific payload requirements, such as
transmitter frequency and power levels, type of receiver, etc. A
typical component list for TT&C-4 is shown in Table 2, listing the
number of com ponents required and their associated failure rates.
It is now possible to make use of the reliability block diagram shown
k
	
	 in Figure 3 to develop the associated reliability characteristics. This
diagram reflects both active and standby forms of redundancy for vario
components. Payload requirements dictate a mission life of no less tha
three years. The derived SRU would therefore have a reliability at that
design life of 0.883. The associated Weibull parameters express the
shape of the reliability curve and serve as input discriptors for the
simulation program. This particular SRU (TT&C-4) was assigned to
three different payloads. In all, 10 different SRUs were required with
three variants (tape recorder options) to satisfy the complete spectrum
of payloads considered.
The remaining subsystems were treated in a similar many
resulting in 11 different attitude and velocity control subsystems (A VCS
-6-
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Table t. Telemetry, Tracking, and C'ominAnd Requirements (Example)
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Figure 2, TT&C Block Diagram (Example)
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and 2 guidance and navigation subsystems (G&N), and 7 Electric-0 Power
Subsystem modules which could be replaced on orbit. Base plates end
power supplies were added to each SRU design and weight and reliability
estimates were developed as described above. Mission equipment modules
were developed in essentially the same manner to arrive at a total inven-
tory of SRUs and NRUs to be used to compose each space serviceable payload.
An example of this process is shown in Figure 4. This
shows the reliability block diagram of the payload and s pecifies its per-
tinent characteristics. This process was performed for each of the 29
different payload designs to be used i n subsequent tradeoffs.
It is important to note tl a various levels of redundancy
assumed because the simulation pro , ess must veflect this in respond-
failure conditions. If for example two of four AVCS-7 SRUs
reaction control units) are required to maintain stabilization of the
payload, it would not be necessary to demand an immediate servicing
operation if one SRU failed. If a second unit failed, however, a servic-
ing flight would be required because any subsequent failure would be
interpreted as loss of the payload. These are arbitrary ground rules
but are easi;y changed in the simulation process. I he significant point
is however, that each payload has unique characteristics which create
different requirements for servicing, even though standard modules are
employed. This aFproach should be representative of the operational
process which would exist if space servicing is incorporated on a broad
applications basis.
2.3	 SPACE SERVICING TRADEOFFS
The fundamental tradeoff addressed the relative cost
of space servicing of automated payloads versus expendable pay-
load design concepts. In addition, various upper stages were con-
sidered to determine the sensitivity of space servicing benef;ts to
the selection of an upper stage. Upper stage candidates employed in
this study were the modified Titan IIIC Transtage, the Transtage with a
kick motor, a 28-foot large-tank Centaur, the full capability Tug, and a
-9-
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Centaur/SEPS (Solar Electric Propulsion Stage) combination.
The results presented here have been limited to geosta-
tionary orbit payloads. Further effort is required to place the remain-
ing orbits of interest in proper perspective. There are 16 different
payload programs scheduled for beustationary orbit in the time period
of 1980 through 1990 (11 years). Approximately 60 percent are COMSAT-
type programs, 30 percent are earth observations, and 10 percent are
Explorer-type programs. The total number of operational payloads in
geostationary orbit at any given time ranges between 30 and 40.
The servicing process consists of recording when a fail-
ure event occurs in each payload deployed to geostationary orbit. The
replacement SRU is then placed in a loading queue to await delivery to
the payload of interest. As other failures occur, the process of load-
ing is continued. When a full load, compatible with the Shuttle and the
upper stage under investigation is achieved, the combined load is deliv-
ered to orbit. The payloads are then placed in an operational state to
-	
await the next failure event. 'This procedure is repeated through a
Monte Carlo process to arrive at a statistical distribution of SRU
replacements and logistic vehicle operations. Cost estimates can then
be implied by equivalent payload procurement and vehicle launch costs.
The results of this simulation effort are shown in Figure 5
indicating the degree to which each payload is serviced over the tirne
period of interest (1980 - 1990). This curve shows that each space
serviceable payload required at least a 6 percent replacement of equip-
ment, and that 20 percent of the payloads required, on the average, a
replacement of approximately 40 percent of their equipment. The
results are related to the NASr% full capability Tug but only slight changes
occur when other upper stages are employed. The average payload avail-
bility shown indicates that, in general, a value above 95 percent is readily
achievable without the use of orbital spares or dedicated logistic opera-
tions. An Li-depth analysis is required if availabilities above 99 percent
are desired, as is ' e case with commercial communication satellites.
1
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Table 3. Simulation Results
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During this time period, 32 space serviceable payloads
were deployed to establish operational systems in geostationary orbit.
Nine of these payloads had failures of non-replaceable units, thereby
forcing a total payload replacement to maintain continuity of the progran,
In addition, on the average, over 145 space replaceable units (SRUs) wer
replaced, representing an equivalent payload procurement of 10 additional
payloads. The total procurement of spa( a serviceable payloads for geo-
stationary orbit is therefore estimated to be approximately 51 payloads.
In addition, during this same time period, approximately 13 expendable
paylooids (not suitable for space servicing) were deployed, providing a
1	 total payload procurement of 64 payloads to fulfill the geostationary oper-
Aional objectives of the October 1973 Mission Model. If space servicing
were not employed, a total procurement of 96 expendable payloads (with
equivalent reliabilities) would be required to provide the same level of
support to operational programs. This represents, conservatively, a
30% improvement in payload procurement costs.
These results are summarized in Table 3* for various
11h 0 ( #
upper stage configurations. The baseline case is taken as the Transtage/
kick motor operation which recovers the Transtage, but employs expend-
able payload designs. The required number of flights is reduced as the
performance capability of the selected upper stage is increased. In per-
forming the analysis, a reduction of one Shuttle flight was assumed to
provide a savings in cost of operations of $10 million. However, in cer-
tain cases, it was necessary to expend the upper stage, resulting in addi-
tional procurement costs. For example, if the Transtage were expended
to deploy payloads, the total number of flights would be reduced from 83
to 54 (35%), saving approximately $290 million in flight operations' costs
*These results have been extended to additional modes of space servicing
with improved loading criteria, as documented in an Aerospace report
(Ref. 2).
.a.
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but forcing the purchase of an extra 35 upper stages at approximately
$5 million each. As a result, the overall return after I1 years of opera-
tion still favors expending the Transtage over the baseline mode by as
much as $93 million. This reflects the fact that even though the baseline
mode of operations normally recovers the Transtage, on the average it
was necessary to expend 19 stages, in addition to the kick motors,
because payload weights were sufficiently high that stage recovery could
not be achieved.
Again, for expendable payload operations, a large tank,
28-ft long Centaur has sufficient performance to deploy all the paylo^. is
in the mission model without the need to expend any of the Centaurs. A
further, although small, reduction in the number of Shuttle flights results
from the use of the full capability Tug, again without expending any pro-
pulsive stages. The return on investment over the 1 1 -year period is
essentially the same for both vehicles, although the DDT&E is consider-
ably greater for the Tug. It is possible that other high energy missions,
such as planetary, may require the higher performance of the full capa-
bility Tug. However, for expendable payload operations in synchronous
equitorial orbit, based on the reference mission model, it would appear
that a large-tank Centaur is adequate.
Continuing with the results presv-nted in 'cable 3, it can be
seen that space servicing offers significant cost benefits over expendable
payload operations.
The Centaur stage used in this space servicing analysis is
based on the current design and incurs a loss of 1454 kg (3200 lb) when
used in a seven-day mission. This penalty is very ar;;vere and results in
a high flight rate even though the number of procured pay!oads is reduced.
It also requires the expenditure of a significant number of stages to accom-
modate the increased payload weights associated with space servicing.
However, the boiloff rate and other losses of the Centaur must be reduced
before its orbital performance could be sufficiently improved to make it a
viable candidate for space servicing. A reduction of 454 kg in the boiloff
-14-
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would reduce the Shuttle flight rate as shown in Figure 6. Although
this boiloff rate is still considerably higher than for the Tug, it would
result in a cost saving of approximately $150 million due to the reduc-
tion in Shuttle flights. Since the estimated DDT& E cost to achieve this
level of boiloff is less than $10 million, it appears to be a worthwhile
investment.
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Figure 5. Impact of Boiloff on Centaur Capability
It is recommended that a thorough review of the Centaur
design be performed, preferably by the manufacturer, to assess its poten-
tial capability (and associated costs) for space servicing, since the Centaur
r,,
results are very sensitive to inert weight and orbital life.
K
	 It can also be seen from Table 3 that the full capability Tug,
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which is being designed to perform a seven-day orbital mission, can
substantially reduce the Shuttle flight rate, leading to a return on invest-
ment of approximately $700 million over the baseline case for the 11-
year period.
This significant cost saving is considered to be conservative
for several reasons. First, flight costs will probably be closer to $12
million per flight because of the additional upper stage functions. Second,
an average payload will probably cost more than $10 million. While com-
munication satellites currently cost approximately $7 million, other opera-
tional and scientific payloads, which are highly complex, are expected to
cost over $40 million each. Finally, no effort was made to optimize the
flight operations; as a result, payloads were serviced as failures occurred
without exercising priorities, leading to relatively poor upper stage load
factors of only 65 percent.
Althoug'-% further improvement could be achieved by additional
analysis, it is obvious that space servicing can offer a substantial payoff
in a relatively short period of time. An initial DDT&F investment of
over $100 million to achieve space serviceable payload configurations
would be returned in five to six years. Since a return on investments
of this magnitude generally requires 10 to 20 years, the cost benefits
cannot be ignored. Moreover, the average time for advancing technologies
to create a new generation of payload configurations has been found to be
approximately six years; thus, a given payload program can upgrade its
payload configuration and realize a return from space servicing within the
first generation of the program plan."'
A further pail;', of importance :s the 	 of design and
operation that space servicing offers. Improvements, in mission equip-
ment can be incorporated as they become available., rather than requir-
ing a new payload design. If a given program drops behind schedule or
cost overruns are imminent because of a single equipment item, the
„j	 requirements can be relaxed to meet the initial deployment schedule
knowing that an improved version of the equipment can be installed on-
-16-
L)	 cot-bit at a later date. Since the subsequent equipment replacement would
only bear a fraction of the flight cost, as compared to a total payload
replacement, it may be possible to reduce the total runout cults while
ai the same time meeting the initial flight schedule.
An alternative to increased orbital lifetime for the Centaur
is to couple its operation with that of a space-based Solar Electric Pro-
pulsion Stage (SEPS). Although a complete analysis could not be performed,
it is possible to extrapolate previous manual calculations to this mission
triodel. In this mode. the Centaur performs two functions: direct payload
deployment of all payloads (including SRUs) nut requiring a SEPS, and sup-
ply of payloads to the SEPS when the Centaur performance will not allow
geostationary operations. In this way, payloads requiring immediate ser-
vicing could be accommodated by the Centaur, whereas heavy payloads
exceeding the Centaur capability would employ a SEPS, making it unneces-
sary to expend an-/ Centaurs. The SEPS, after receiving payloads and
SRLJs fcom it single Centaur flight, then will transfer frum position to
position to service numerous payloads in orbit. Initial deployment and
retrieval of the SEPS is performed by the Centaur.
The reference SEPS is a 25 kW configuration with approxi-
mately 1360 kg (3000 lb) of mercury propellant, achieving a specific
impulse of 3000 seconds. Although deployiYient and retrieval oper-.c.­;1Ls
may require 20 to 30 days, the servicing time in geostationary orbit :a
quite competitive with the full capability Tug, in the order or two to
three days. As shown in Table 3, the cost benefita exceed $800 million
ovee the baseline reference case. In this case, the Centaur is quite
c: ,.smpetitive with the full capability Tug because orbital lifetime is not
a problem. The additional $ 100 million to $150 million savings should
be sufficient to cover adaptation of the SEPS to space servicing, assurn-
ing that the SEPS is developed for planetary operations. In fact, the
benefits are such that it may be possible to compensate for the total
SEPS development cost, although further optimization would be required
'ic
	
to obtain definitive results.
• v
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G. 4	 CONCLUSIONS
Although a great deal of analysis is still heeded, it is
apparent from the results developed in this study that space servicing
should be pursued, especially for geostationary orbits. The potential
benefits in terms of costs, flexibility for equipment changes, and
increased reliability of operations more than compensate for the pay-
load weight increase and the associated investment required to develop
this operational concept, however, it may be difficult to convince the
payload users to take this step due to a concern over the risk of devel-
oping the concept. Therefore, the following recommendations are
submitted.
2.5	 RECOMMENDATIONS
One alternative is to initiate a pilot program prior to
Shuttle IOC to demonstrate the operational technique. It may be possi-
ble, using the USAF Space Technology Program (STP), to develop a
simple payload experiment program that can be deployed with a replace-
ment SRU after sufficient information is accumulated from the initial
experiment. The service unit could be derived from several options,
using existing equipments or prototype development items to maintain
a low cost operation. Experience with the servicing unit should be
beneficial also because it will aid in developing requirements and com-
ponents for future upper stage operations, especially for rendezvous
and docking operations.
The advantage of this pilot program lies in focusing atten-
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tion on a new concept which must involve the payload user from the
start. This involvement should enhance standardization of subsystems
by emphasizing interface relationFhips and design guidelines.
While a pilot program will not completely overcome the
payload developer's reluctance to take the first step toward space ser-
hol	 vicing because of uncertainty in the development risk, it should move
the process much closer to reality.
-18-
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3. PAYLOAD/TUG SOFTWARE COST ESTIMATES
3. 1	 SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS
In addition to the space servicing efforts discussed in
Section 2, a functional analysis of upper stagN operations was performed
to establish the overall software requirements. For the purpose of this
effort, the MSFC full capability cryogenic Tug was assumed to be the
upper stage; however, the results are not particularly sensitive to the
vehicle itself. Tug operations include the space flight and servicing
functions as well as ground checkout and mission control center support.
The functional analysis was based upon Titan IIIC experience for deploy-
ment of expendable payloads.
In parallel with the software requirements development, a
survey of software costs was performed. This involved contacting several
software and computer development firms to determine their procedures
for estimating software costs. This also served to point out the major
factors influencing software costs over and above the basic programming
effort. The results of this effort are do -umented in an Aerospace Techni-
cal Report (Ref 3). A summary is provided below.
From the functional analysis it waE determined that the space-
borne software would require approximately 30,000 words of instructions
to perform space servicing. An additional 2,000 words would be required
for the service unit sequencer. These functions include orbital transfer,
navigation updates, rendezvous and docking, and other support functions.
Ground checkout software functions were estimated to require
over 1 million words of instructions for Tug preparations. The service
unit would require an additional 100,000 words. This estimate assumes
that the overall ground support operations are managed by a large compu-
ter complex similar to the Launch Processing System currently envi-
sioned for the Kennedy Space Center. As such, many peripheral functions
would be required in support of the Shuttle and could be shared by the upper
-19-
stage with nu impact.
A similar approach was assurncd fur the Mission Control
Center (MCC) functions. The MCC is required to support Shuttle opera-
tions, including all telemetry conditioning, tracking and navigation
updates, display formatting, and command uplink capability. As such
the additi(,nal support required for the tipper stage and servicing ftinc-
tions is estimated to have a minimal impact on the flight support func-
tiuns. Fur this reason, it was estimated that approximately 30,000 words
of instruction would be required plus an e._-iition4l 5,000 words to support
the service unit.
In developing these estimates, serious consideration was
given to two other points which bear on the software requirements. One
is that all payload checkout operations are performed by the payload user,
not by the Tug or service unit. The service unit exchanges space replace-
able units (SRUs) and verifies proper insertion, but that is the extent of
the service operation. This is particularly significant when considering
the wide variety of payloads to be serviced. To expect one universal
checkout system to exist on the service unit is unrealistic. The second
point concerns Tug/service unit and payload responses to contingencies and
the possible need for manned interactive support. A brief contingency
analysis was performed (Ref 4), which indicates that a visual check of the
payload configuration prior to ducking is necessary to assure a clear path
of approach. Consequently, the above software estimates are based upon
automated servicing operations with a command override capability from
MCC to support a stand-off and inspection maneuver before and after ser-
vicing.
The impact of the above software requirements cannot be
assessed without some basis for estimating future software costs. Soft-
ware costing has always been elusive and difficult to predict for several
reasons. In surveying various contractor efforts, the one point that con-
tinually arose was the lack of firm software requirements. This tends to
negate any software cost estimating; relationships (CERs). Although
actual software costs may exist, it is difficult to relate these costs to
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an original set of requirements. 'rhe approach taken, therefore, was to
establish a basic cost estimate related to the words of instruction g rid then
use modifiers to adjust this cost based upon empit ical judgment factors.
The results of the survey are shown in Figure 7. Various
programs .ire shown relative to the number of wards in machine language
versus the man months of effort to develop, coc'e, and check out the pro-
gram. It should be recognized that in several cases the points shown do
not represent tutal program efforts, but unly a portion for which data
could be found. This is sufficient for developing the relationship shown.
It should alsu be noted that a band for the updated Titan IIIC airborne com-
puter is provided. This band reflects the fact that ilthuugh a fixed word
count exists there are several contractors involved and therefore the actual
cost, including integration, may be double that derived from the curve.
1'hi% point is discussed next.
Five factors were considered as modifiers of the basic rela-
tionship shuwn in Figure 7. They are computer capacity, program com-
plexity, prior experience, coding; language, and level of integration effort
required. When taken together, these factors, based upon a manpower
cost of $4000 per man month, increase the basic spaceborne software
cost from $3. 93 million to $9. 91 million, a factor of approximately 250
percent.
Similar approaches were taken for ground checkout and
flight support hardware. Basic cost ratios range from $200 per word for
spaceborne systems to $7 per word for ground and flight support. Adjust-
ing these values for the five factors mentioned above provides the overall
results show y, in Table 4. The total developmental cost for a Shuttle
upper stage is estimated to be approximately $21 million. Of this, less
than 10% would result from ", e additional functions related to space ser-
vicing. In addition, it is es—noted, based upon Titan IIIC, Agena, and
Centaur experience, that yearly recurring costs would be approximately
$2. 5 million per year.
L".1
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3. 2
	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the following conclusions are drawn:
a. Manned interactive support is required for stand-off and
inspection operations prior to and after space servicing.
b. The majority of upper stage and service unit functions can
be readily automated without a serious impact on the soft-
ware costs.
C.	 Total software costs for the upper stage program should
not exceed approximately $21 million, of which less than
10 percent would be due to servicing operations. This
total represents only 5 percent or less of the overa:l upper
stage development costs, which is considered to be very
realistic.
d. Recurring software costs, including program improvements,
generation of new coefficients and preflight verifications
efforts should not exceed $L. 5 million per year based upon
an estimated flight rate of 10 flights per year.
e. The lack of a firm software specification and the overall
integration of the software effort will probably be the major
factors involved in software costs and should be tightly con-
trolled from the outset of program initiation.
f. New techniques need to be developed to reduce future soft-
ware costs, such as structured programming or standardiza-
tion of software modules. NASA GSFC has been investigat-
ing these techniques in an effort to keep spiraling costs in
check. This Hype of work should be encouraged.
I
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4. STUDY CONCLU:;fONS
The principal conclusion to be drawn from this Study effort
is that space servicing, especially in geostationary orbit, is substan-
tially more attractive as an operational concept than continued use of
expendable payload designs. The potential savings in payload procure-
ment and logistics cost over an 11-year period should be more than suf-
ficient to compensate for associated DDT&E costs. In addition, the capa-
bility to modify the mission equipment as new designs evolve offers unpar-
alleled flexibility for performing scientific programs at substantial savings.
This effort has been restricted in depth but the general char-
aster of future operations can be assessed. For example, the random
demands for servicing do not appear to place any severe demands on
fleet size. The overall flight rate is in fact reduced substantially, while
still maintaining a relatively high payload availability. The average down
Itime, when a critical failure occurs, should not exceed 60 days on thr:
average. Also, it can be expected that, on the average, 25 percent of
the modules within a given satellite will require replacement to satisfy
the requirements of the reference NASA Mission Model.
The results further indicate that study activities should be
directed toward space ba -ed servicing operations in geostationary orbit.
Consequently, although further analysis is needed, it is very apparent
thai this concept should not be precluded when considering development
of a servicing capability.
Finally, a recommendation is made to initiate a low cost
pilot flight test program to demonstrate automated space servic.ng  to the
payload community. The objectives of such a test are to develop confi-
dence in the concept, demonstrate that the associated technical risk is
minimal, and to show that operational procedures are adequate to sup-
"60^	 port this concept. Further work is planned on this subject in the next
Study effort to be initiated in September 1974.
Ck
TRWMNG lAGE BLANK NOT
It has also been shown that software costs associated
with the upper stage for rendezvous, docking, servicing, or retriev;
operations do not impose a substantial cost burden on the Tug develop-
ment. The costs are not expected to exceed $21 million for develop-
ment with a recurring annual cost not to exceed $2. 5 million. The
impact of servicing is predicted to be relatively minor, less than 10
percent of the total software costs. Consequently, there is nu reason
to suspect that software development represents a severe risk to the
Tug development or to space servicing operations.
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